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BIOMEDICINE AND BIOETHICS: DE LEGE LA TA,
DE LEGE FERENDA
... The Law today, as laid down, and what tommorrow
may bring."
George P. Smith, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
It was Plato who cautioned that "[w]e know how human nature may be
degraded; [but] we do not know how by artificial means any improvement in
the breed can be effected."' The very essence, however, of biological exist-
ence is change-with no living things or their environment ever being in a
state of constant equilibrium.2 Over history, man has not only sought to
understand himself, but to control his identity.3 The mere availability of a
means often impels us to seek for an end that it can accomplish.4 Yet, at the
heart of biological engineering-recognized as but one facet of human engi-
neering-is a concern for the well-being of others; a desire that others should
have a bigger claim to the good life, with as little suffering as possible.'
With the development of tests for genetic defects in the human egg before
fertilization, a new and exciting gloss has been put on preconceptual and
prenatal diagnosis and a previously unexplored avenue in genetic screening
and ultimate engineering has been opened.6 Similarly, announcement of the
* B.S., J.D., Indiana University, LL.M. Columbia University, Professor of Law, The
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1. THE WORKS OF PLATO 246 (B. Jowett trans., 1937).
2. DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES 212 (1968).
3. Id. at 215. See generally DAVID SUZUKI & PETER KNUDTSON, GENETICS: THE ETH-
ICS OF ENGINEERING LIFE (rev. ed. 1990).
4. Martin P. Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, 15 UCLA L. REV. 443,
446 (1968).
5. Id. at 455. See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW
(1981).
6. Andrew Purvis, An Early-Warning System, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, at 56.
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first attempt to conduct human gene therapy, the procedure by which dis-
eases are cured by inserting foreign genes into a patient's injured cells, has
heightened interest in the genetics revolution.7
The federal government's decision to map the precise location of each of
the approximately 50,000 genes that make up the full human complement,"
referred to as the human genome, holds great promise that due to precon-
ceptual and prenatal screening, chromosomal, polygenic, and somatic cell
disorders will eventually become problems of the past. Even though it is
estimated that it will take at least fifteen years before the genome is mapped, 9
ethical concerns are being raised over possible genetic discrimination, such
as differential employment and insurance treatment as a consequence of a
negative genetic profile. There is the further danger of eugenic pressures
being exerted upon individuals with dangerous recessive traits in order to
prohibit them from procreating or forcing women carrying fetuses with ge-
netic abnormalities to abort.'° The genome project has been termed one of
the cultural challenges of the next several decades in that it will call into
focus and directly challenge the extent to which a political commitment is
made to equality in the face of the sciences of inequality; genetics being "pre-
eminently a science of inequality of human difference.""
New medical technologies have the ability not only to shape life before it
begins, but also-sadly-to prolong life past the time when it should have a
dignified ending. 2 Both the development of "life" in the test tube through
in vitro fertilization and its prolongation in the intensive care units in hospi-
tals throughout the country present yet another focus of concern for the
bioethicist.' l The need to ration scarce and exotic medical resources be-
comes more and more an obvious reality at all junctures of the New Biol-
7. Larry Thompson, Gene Therapy in Humans Approved: First Recipients Likely to be
Those with Lethal Skin Cancer, WASH. POST, July 31, 1990, at A3; see Leon Jaroff, Giant Step
for Gene Therapy, TIME, Sept. 24, 1990, at 74.
8. Robin Henig, Pitfalls of Genetic Screening, WASH. POST Jan. 29, 1991, at Health
Mag., 14. Alternatively, it has been estimated that the human genome consists of up to 100,000
genes. See also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS AND BIOTECHNOL-
OGY 6 (1989).
9. Henig, supra note 8.
10. Id.; see John C. Fletcher, Where in the World Are We Going with The New Genetics?, 5
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 33 (1989).
11. Genetics Research and Its Ethical Implications: Three Perspectives, FRONTLINES, Jan.
1991, at 8, 9 (quoting Dr. Thomas H. Murray); see George P. Smith, II, Genetics, Eugenics and
Policy, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435.
12. See Bernard Ficarra, Twentieth Century Indicators of Change in American Medical
Practice for the 21st Century, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 (1990); see also DANIEL
CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 253 (1990).
13. Russell Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experimental
Medicine, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1985).
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ogy.' 4 Rules that cut through the agonies of ambiguity and uncertainty
simply do not exist-for the harsh dimension of reality brought within each
situation of clinical conflict shapes the ultimate response. 15
Contemporary advances in biotechnology and medical science are creating
new uses for bodily tissues heretofore considered to have no value beyond
their original functions. 16 Indeed, more and more Americans are engaged in
the business of selling themselves piecemeal. The fast-growing market in
human products includes not only blood, semen, eggs, tissues, organs, and
subparts, but even children. This ultimately translates into profits from the
sale, patenting, and transplantation of human materials.17 At the same time,
troubling ethical possibilities for clinical researchers and the industry as a
whole are raised by the bio-material boom.'"
Biotechnology may be defined broadly to include all techniques using liv-
ing organisms (or parts thereof) to make or modify products, to improve
plants or animals, or to develop micro-organisms for specific uses. 9 "New"
biotechnology includes recombinant DNA techniques, cell fusion, and novel
biopressing techniques, while "old" biotechnology includes the use of micro-
organisms for brewing and baking, or selective breeding in agriculture and
animal husbandry.20 Within the past fifteen years, biotechnology has broad-
ened its impact to include research in a range of diverse fields, from cancer
and AIDS to "super" dairy cows and tomatoes.2 '
14. See generally LARRY R. CHURCHILL, RATIONING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA
(1987); Samuel Gorovitz, Bioethics and Social Responsibility, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS 52, 53 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 1978).
15. RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, THE CRITICAL CALLING 358 (1988); see ELI GINZBERG,
THE MEDICAL TRIANGLE: PHYSICIANS, POLITICIANS AND THE PUBLIC (1990); Zelman
Cowen, Law, Medicine and Biotechnology, 14 MELANESIAN L.J. 1 (1986).
16. Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes". Assessing the Nonconsensual Re-
moval of Cadaver Organs Under The Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
528, 529-32 (1990).
17. Andrew Kimbrell, The Human Body Shop, WASH. POST, July 1, 1990, at B3; see also
G.L. Morgan, Is There A Right to Fetal Tissue Transplantation? 10 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 157
(1991) (discussing the ethical concerns raised by the development of fetal tissue transplantation
techniques as a medical treatment for such illnesses as Parkinson's disease).
18. James F. Childress, Some Moral Connections Between Organ Procurement and Organ
Distribution, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 85, 86-87 (1987). See generally JERRY E.
BISHOP & MICHAEL WALDHOLZ, GENOME (1990) (discussing the impact of the utilization of
molecular genetics to locate and identify individual human genes).
19. Roland M. Nardone, Clinical Biotechnology-A Perspective, 2 CLINICAL BIOTECH. 9,
10 (1990).
20. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 4 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOL-
OGY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 3 (1988); see also AGRICULTURAL BIOETHICS:
IMPLICATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY (Steven M. Gendel et al. eds., 1990).
21. Editorial, When Science Outruns Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 1990, at A20; see also J.
Madeleine Nash, Tracking Down Killer Genes, TIME, Sept. 17, 1990, at 11; J. Madeleine Nash,
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Perhaps the most startling and potentially lucrative of all the biotechno-
logical advances with human tissue is seen in applied research where the
development and subsequent therapeutic use of cell lines is being advanced.
These lines are created from either healthy or cancerous human tissue and
are used in turn to develop drugs and other useful biological substances. 22
The market for these cell lines and their human tissue by-products is valued
presently in the billions of dollars and is likely to grow even larger.23
The federal government, acting through its National Institutes of Health
and reacting to pressure from scientific groups and the biotechnology indus-
try, rescinded its plans to impose strict conflict-of-interest guidelines on
health researchers who receive federal funding for research in biotechnology.
The rules, if enforced, would have barred scientists from holding an equity
stake in the companies that might benefit from their research and would
have prevented scientists from consulting with companies on NIH-funded
work and sharing information with private firms until it was publicly avail-
able.24 Such a set of rules, it was contended, would not only stifle the spirit
of capitalism but also, equally as important, would impede free scientific
inquiry.2 5
The contemporary challenge of bioethics is rather simple and direct in its
mandate, but is exceedingly complex in its application. The legal and ethical
evaluations and constructions of law, medicine, biotechnology, and genetic
engineering need to be set within a continuing dialogue that is tied to a basic
understanding of and respect for human rights and human dignity. More-
A Bumper Crop ofBiotech, TIME, Oct. 1, 1990, at 92. See generally Diana A. Mark, Comment,
All Animals Are Equal, But Some Are Better Than Others: Patenting Transgenic Animals, 7 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245 (1991).
22. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 1 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOL-
OGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 31-35 (1987). See also Bernard M. Dick-
ens, Living Tissue and Organ Donors and Property Law: Moore on Moore, J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 73 (1992).
23. See Joan O'C. Hamilton et al., Biotech: America's Dream Machine, Bus. WK., Mar. 2,
1992, at 66 (discussing the success of biotech companies as publicly-held entities). See gener-
ally PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
(Feb. 1991) (calling upon federal agencies to-among other things-implement the provisions
of the Technology Transfer Act of 1986, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § s 3701 to 3714
(1988), advance opportunities for commercialization of scientific research; and develop and
maintain risk-based regulations that, although maintaining safety in the field of biotechnology,
do not unnecessarily burden the field's growth and create economic incentives for continued
commercial development of biotechnology through favorable tax policies).
24. Malcolm Gladwell, NIH Drops Plan to Set Strict Rules for Biotech Industry, WASH.
POST, Dec. 30, 1989, at BI; see ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOP-
MENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT (1988). See generally
Sidney A. Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1990)
(discussing the need to restructure the regulatory system of the biotechnology field).
25. Shapiro, supra note 24, at 1-3.
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over, what is needed today is a new human rights debate not only among the
members of the legal community, but also among scientists and technolo-
gists. Such a debate would, of necessity, consider anew the extent to which
the plethora of medical, legal, scientific, and technological considerations of
the brave new world would either challenge or complement both the tradi-
tional rights of humanity and those being redefined according to contempo-
rary values and standards. 26 Mr. Justice Michael D. Kirby, President
Justice of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Austra-
lia, has eloquently warned: "If lawyers are to continue to play a relevant part
in the human rights debate of the future, they must become more aware of
scientific and technological advances. Otherwise, they will increasingly lack
understanding of the questions to be asked, let alone the answers to be
given." 27
Often, the law has responded or reacted to, rather than directed, an
agenda for social needs and demands. Indeed, the former Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, Warren E. Burger, once observed: "Law
does not search out as do science and medicine; it -reacts to social needs and
demands." 28 Law, science, and medicine must become full, unlimited part-
ners in the bioethical ventures of modern society. They must march in uni-
son as they approach the task of assuring the primary goal of society itself:
namely, that all citizens be provided with an equal opportunity to achieve
their maximum potential for human growth, development, interpersonal re-
lations, and intellectual fulfillment within the economic marketplace as well
as the marketplace of ideas, and to have not only their physical suffering
minimized and their spiritual tranquility assured, but also to have their
rights of autonomy and/or self-determination recognized.29
Within whatever context or vectors of force bioethical conundrums arise,
the "simple" construct for decision making will be the application of a bal-
26. LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AF-
FAIRS (1985).
27. Michael D. Kirby, Human Rights-The Challenge of The New Technology, 60 AUSTL.
L.J. 170, 181 (1986); see George P. Smith, II, Assisted Noncoital Reproduction: A Comparative
Analysis, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 21, 29-30 (1990).
28. Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, in I ETHICAL,
LEGAL & SOCIAL CHALLENGES To A BRAVE NEW WORLD 211 (George P. Smith, II, ed.
1982); see also Zelman Cowen, Reflections on Medicine Biotechnology and the Law, 14 MELA-
NESIAN L.J. 1 (1986). Sir Zelman Cowen, commenting on the impact of rapid advances in
medicine and biotechnology, has stated that, "the time cushion which used to exist within
which lawmakers could prepare legal regulations to state society's standards has virtually dis-
appeared." Id. at I.
29. George P. Smith, II, Biotechnology and The Law: Social Responsibility or Freedom of
Scientific Inquiry?, 39 MERCER L. REV. 437, 441 (1988). See generally Randolph W. Thrower
Symposium: Genetics and the Law, 39 EMORY L.J. 619 (1990).
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ancing test that seeks to yield a final action that minimizes human suffering
and maximizes the social good. If the contours of each situational dilemma
are guided thusly, we will approach and utilize the new and startling discov-
eries of the twenty-first century with a spirit of beneficence, autonomy, and
distributive justice and, as Daedalus, have a safe and rewarding journey. If,
however, we set out with reckless abandon and are driven only by blind
power and greed, we will be surely corrupted and, as Icarus, fall.
II. NORMATIVE ETHICS AND METAETHICS
There are two main divisions of ethics: normative and metaethics. Norma-
tive ethics concerns itself with determining what actions are good or bad,
right or wrong, and with related evaluations such as praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness. Metaethics analyzes the meaning of ethical terms and
also-at another level-structures and assesses criteria for evaluating com-
peting normative ethical theories." Normative ethical theories are classed
as either teleological, consequentialist, or deontological (formalist).31 The
teleologist asserts that there is but one, ultimate right-making characteristic:
namely, "the comparative value (nonmoral) of what is, probably will be, or
is intended to be brought into being.' ' 32 The central principle espoused by
the deontologist is to maximize the balance of good over evil without any
one ultimate moral criterion.33 Thus, each person and each situation are
taken as unique.
The goal of reaching rational judgments, or those conclusions based on
general principles of applicability or universalized maxims, would-at first
blush-appear to play havoc with those espousing moral judgments for each
situation or action.34 Yet, when one utilizes the immutable first-order given
as the maintenance of purposeful living-both in the early potential for life
(preconceptionally and prenatally) and its subsequent continuation and use
as a human or fundamental right-there is no uncertainty of focus at all for
the deontologist or situationalist. When the goal of life is viewed as a quest
for total maximization--economic, social, spiritual, cultural, intellectual, or
political-this norm is the clear direction or reference point advanced by the
situation ethic. Any action that challenges this goal, then, is balanced out.
In other words, the costs of changing the course of a present action are bal-
anced against the benefits of nonaction. This balancing mechanism affords a
30. MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & Roy G. SPECE, JR., BIOETHICS AND LAW 73 (1981).
31. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 81.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 85.
De Lege Lata, De Lege Ferenda
I
far better opportunity to achieve the goal of distributive justice than does the
unyielding application of a teleological a priori standard.
The Metaethical Quagmire
Metaethics examines specifically how normative standards should be
structured and what the standards should be for applying genetic rules of
research and development to future generations.35 A uniform core of stan-
dards is needed. Individual judgments of scientists, which have proven
faulty and inadequate, 36 should be replaced by an ethic that assures collec-
tive social responsibility. 37 An a priori ethic, which rests on the faith that
certain acts are inherently immoral, 38 does not meet this requirement. A
pragmatic ethic, which requires that one make choices that offer a maximum
of desirable consequences, 39 does seem to fulfill the goal of collective respon-
sibility. If the results of biomedical research would contribute to human
well-being, a practical ethic would sanction the research.'
Two types of pragmatic ethics exist within the general category: rule utili-
tarianism and case utilitarianism. Rule utilitarians stress the need for a
weighing of the good that an entire class or category of experiments, such as
reproduction in the laboratory, would produce.4 If they conclude that the
research would not provide sufficient benefits, they would disapprove of the
entire class or category of experiments.42 Case utilitarians, on the other
hand, would weigh the good that each separate case or situation would pro-
vide. Under this ethical approach, laboratory reproduction might be proper
in certain cases but improper in others.43 Either type of a practical ethic is
consistent with the need to seek a consensus ethic to guide biomedical re-
search that is not aligned with humanism, metarationalism, or assumptions
of faith, but rather is tied solely to a communion of shared values derived
from observable experiences.' No condemnation of laboratory reproduc-
35. Daniel Callahan, Normative Ethics and Public Morality in the Life Sciences, THE HU-
MANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 5, 6-7; see RAZIEL ABELSON, ETHICS AND METAETHICS 4, 4-5
(1963).
36. See Callahan, supra note 35, at 6.
37. See Eugene B. Brody, Biomedical Innovation, Values, and Anthropological Research,
158 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 85, 85-87 (1974).
38. See Joseph Fletcher, New Beginnings in Life: A Theologian's Response, in THE NEW
GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN, 78, 79-80 (Michael P. Hamilton ed., 1972).
39. Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 776, 778
(1971).
40. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 83.
41. Id. at 82; see also SIDNEY ZINK, THE CONCEPTS OF ETHICS 93-94, 180-81 (1962).
42. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 82.
43. Id. at 82-83.
44. Id. at 88-89.
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tion would be made pursuant to a consensus ethic unless either the means or
the ends of the research were incompatible with human needs45 or unless a
common consent, achieved through verifiable reasoning, required ending the
experiment. 6 One scholar has suggested that, in the final analysis, reason
together with imagination can produce a "reasonable guess" and that is
about all that that can ever be done.47
The creation of life and the remaking of man frame the ultimate ethical
issues resulting from increased genetic knowledge. 48 Genetic modifications
are intermediate expressions of this ultimate capacity and cloning exempli-
fies the final consequences. To illustrate the issues that an ethical system
must resolve in dealing with biomedical technologies, consider the conse-
quences of surrogate motherhood.49 If donors of sperm have no claim over
children born of their sperm through artificial insemination, a donor of an
ovum should have no superior rights over the "real" mother.5" When a phy-
sician seeks to implant an ovum into another woman, he should obtain per-
mission from the donor for the transfer or implant. However, what if the
donating woman has strong religious or other objections to in vitro fertiliza-
tion that would have led her to refuse permission if she were told that her
ova were to be used for that purpose? If the doctor has obtained permission
to use a donor's ovum for in vitro fertilization, what happens if, after fertili-
zation, an embryo begins to develop abnormally? Who should make the de-
cision to discard or to keep a defective embryo: the donor woman, the
desiring couple, the geneticists, the obstetrician, or all of these individuals
together?5 These dilemmas may be upon us rather quickly.
The prospect of producing "optimum babies" introduces another issue
that bioethics must resolve. Many people might raise objections to the regu-
lation of life beginning in the laboratory rather than in the home. This issue
forces consideration of the interests of a new participant - the scientist. To
some, this depersonalization of the procreative process is most undesirable;52
human procreation for them "is more complete human activity precisely be-
45. Id. at 89. See generally Richard A. McCormick, Therapy or Tampering? The Ethics of
Reproductive Technology, 153 AMERICA 396, 397 (1985).
46. Fletcher, supra note 38, at 89; see also James M. Gustafson, Basic Ethical Issues in the
Bio-Medical Fields, 53 SOUNDINGS 151, 177 (1970).
47. Daniel Callahan, New Beginnings in Life: A Philosopher's Response, in THE NEW GE-
NETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 90, 91-92 (Michael P. Hamilton ed., 1972).
48. KENNETH VAUX, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS: MORALITY FOR THE NEW MEDICINE 51-52
(1974).
49. Leon R. Kass, New Beginnings in Life, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF
MAN 15, 36-37 (Michael P. Hamilton ed., 1972).
50. Id. at 37-38.
51. Id. at 34-35.
52. Id. at 53-54.
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cause it engages us bodily and spiritually as well as rationally. ' 13 Acts of
laboratory procreation may threaten the sanctity of marriage and the human
family.5 4 A scientific mastery should not drive out a spiritual mystery.
These criticisms of new biomedical research have led some to suggest a
professional moratorium on human experimentation with in vitro fertiliza-
tion and embryo transfer until safety procedures are perfected that will safe-
guard against "the further dehumanization of man."5 5 Development of such
safeguards could take many forms: studies of the normality of the offspring
produced by the technologies of the New Biology among lower order mam-
mals; establishment of intraprofessional organizations to discuss and evalu-
ate work in this area; promotion of interdisciplinary discussion to fully
apprise all concerned of the consequences of continued in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer research in order to minimize any possible negative so-
cial consequences; development of an international forum for the full explo-
ration of ways in which misdirections in biomedicine may be averted; and,
ultimately, the creation of ethical guide-lines for the application of the New
Biology, drawing on the skills of lawyers, legislators, theologians, philoso-
phers, humanists, social scientists, and laymen. 56
Research into the impact of biomedical technologies and consideration of
the ethical dilemmas involved does not require a moratorium on human ex-
perimentation; the two can continue concurrently. Yet, no federally funded
research on in vitro fertilization has been undertaken since 1975, when the
research moratorium went into effect. 57 Society should encourage, not stifle,
53. Id. at 53.
54. Id. at 54.
55. Leon R. Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical Experiments on the
Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1178 (1971); see generally Morgan, supra note 17.
56. Kass, supra note 55, at 1178.
57. Susan Abramowitz, A Stalemate on Test-Tube Baby Research, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Feb. 1984, at 5. Even though the 1979 Report of the Ethics Advisory Board of what was
then the Department of Health Education and Welfare concluded that federal support of re-
search on humans in order to establish the safety and the effectiveness of IVF procedures
would be ethically permissible so long as certain conditions were met (44 Fed. Reg. 35,057
(1979)), the report has never been accepted or the moratorium ended; and there is no real
likelihood such action will be taken soon. John C. Fletcher & Kenneth J. Ryan, Federal Regu-
lations for Fetal Research: A Case for Reform, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 126, 129-30
(1987). Yet, Congressman Henry A. Waxman introduced a bill entitled, The National Insti-
tutes of Health Revitalization Amendments of 1991 that-if enacted into legislation-would
have had the effect of lifting the moratorium on federal funding of research on transplanting
fetal tissue and allowing federal funding of such research if it complied with strict ethical
guidelines prohibiting sales of fetal tissues or directed donations. H.R. 1532, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991). This bill was subsequently substituted and replaced by Congressman Waxman's
introduction of H.R. 2507, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (on the same topic) that passed the
House on July 25, 1991. 137 CONG. REC. H5879 (daily ed. July 25, 1991). Senator Edward M.
Kennedy has introduced S. 1523, 102d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991), parts of which in addition to
1993]
242 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:233
research; for a society unable to accept and encourage either current or fu-
ture behavioral variations does not promote a hospitable environment for the
free development and expression of ideas of any kind.5" Man cannot learn
by merely thinking in this area.
III. AUTONOMY, BENEFICENCE AND JUSTICE
There are three principle duties, rights, and values within the field of
bioethics: autonomy or self-determination, beneficence, and justice.59 There
is continuing debate over the dependence or independence of these three
principles and the role they play in bioethical decisions.' Rather than per-
ceive conflict and disharmony, however, what should be recognized here is
the complementary focus and blending of all three principles in the ultimate
goal of minimizing human suffering and maximizing the social good. Thus,
autonomy, beneficence and justice are all balanced against one another in an
effort to maximize the social utility and personal good of an individual in
controversy. Their relationship is inextricable. The state exists to better life
for its citizens and, indeed, each citizen seeks to better himself by the confer-
ral of positive benefits that, in turn, promote the good life for him. Autono-
mous, reasonable people act accordingly in undertaking those courses of
action designed to advance well-being. Justice, thus, becomes an aspira-
tional codification of the common good.
A. Autonomy
Autonomy, or self-determination, finds its essence and current expression
in the rich and evolving tradition of human rights which in turn has had a
significant impact on Western social and political thought over the last four
centuries.61 This newly refined and activated right of self-determination has
fast become the benchmark of the new patients' rights movement. It is inte-
gral, as well, to issues of informed consent in clinical and research settings,
abortion (where the right of control of one's body is asserted under the ru-
bric of "free choice"), euthanasia62 (where the right to die with dignity is
dealing with NIH re-authorization, consider ways to modify the ban on fetal experimentation.
See David Brown, Senate Panel Is Asked to Lift Ban on Fetal Tissue Research, WASH. POST,
Nov. 22, 1991, at A3. On January 22, 1993, President William Clinton lifted the moratorium
on federal funding of research involving transplantation of fetal tissue from induced abortions.
Weekly Compliation of Presidential Documents, Jan. 25, 1992, at 87.
58. See generally NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971).
59. Leroy Walters, Bioethics as a Field of Ethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICs 49, 50-51 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Leroy Walters eds., 1978).
60. See Gustafson, supra note 46 passim.
61. Walters, supra note 59, at 51.
62. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECI-
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asserted), and within a wide range of other health-care-delivery issues rang-
ing from allocation of limited resources and regulation of health care to re-
sponsibility for dependent persons.6 3
Put directly, "the claim for autonomy is a claim for self-ownership and
self-governance that each person has for his own body or person and the
labor it generates."'  Some would seek to distinguish between the ideal or
principle of autonomy and the principles of respect for personal autonomy-
the latter of which obligates a respect for the autonomous choice and the
actions of others.65 It is important for the maintenance of moral life that
individuals be competent, informed, and act voluntarily in their decisions.66
Personal choice may be exercised, however, that delegates this inherent first-
order decisional power or that responsibility to make decisions regarding the
rightness and wrongness of particular patterns of conduct. Accordingly, an
individual may wish to yield to his physician when a particular medical pro-
cedure is proposed, or to defer to his religious institution of affiliation in
matters of sexual ethics.67
In accepting the principles of respect for autonomy, not only must a deter-
mination be made regarding whether a patient is autonomous, but-addi-
tionally-a determination must be made as to what has in fact been chosen,
with the patient's present consents and dissents being placed within a broad
temporal context that encompasses both the past and the future, because
obviously different preferences are expressed at different times.68 All too
often, analysis and application of the principle of respect for autonomy fo-
cuses on the present; for example, has informed consent or refusal been given
at this time?69 A central question raised as a consequence of this position
asks when there is justification in overriding a patient's present autonomous
choices or actions in light of his past or (anticipated) future choices and
actions? Under proper conditions, the principle of respect for autonomy can
be overridden or infringed upon. Thus, nonautonomous persons (tradition-
ally children and the insane) would be likely candidates. Even when this
SIONs 89-118 (1989); George P. Smith, II, Re-Thinking Euthanasia and Death with Dignity: A
Transnational Challenge, 12 ADEL. L. REV. 480 (1990).
63. Walters, supra note 59, at 50.
64. Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 713, 727 (1989).
65. James F. Childress, The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 12-13.
66. Id. at 13.
67. Id.; see Edmund D. Pellegrino & David C. Thomasma, The Conflict Between Auton-
omy and Beneficence in Medical Ethics: Proposal for a Resolution, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 23 (1987).
68. See Childress, supra note 65, at 13.
69. Id.
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occurs, an explanation and justification of the action should be made to
those whose autonomy has been infringed or to their surrogate agents.7"
B. Beneficence
The prevention of harm and the production of good are the two distinct
but related foci of the principle of beneficence; with medical ethics emphasiz-
ing the first under the normative command: "Do no harm." Accordingly,
for the health care professional, in context, this principle means that he or
she must take care in his or her actions not to compound an ill patient's
condition by causing or complicating further illness.71 This principle is ex-
panded and applied by bioethicists to their research by adherence to a stan-
dard of concern for the protection of human subjects. It is coupled with an
advance assessment of the possible negative social consequences that might
come from new biomedical technologies in order to protect large groups of
individuals from potential harm.72 Because biomedical advances carry sig-
nificant social costs, it has been argued that society should be willing to
adopt a less permissive and more critical stance toward new technologies in
this field.73
Even though no sharp breaks can be found on the continuum between
"preventing harm" and "producing good," beneficence-as a positive princi-
ple-is regarded as being more directive because it requires conferring bene-
fits rather than avoiding harm. In the sense that it allows the risk of at least
some harm in the ultimate course of attempting to produce great benefits,
the positive principle may thus be less stringent than the negative. Indeed, it
is because of the promise of advances in scientific or medical knowledge that
biomedical research is often justified. In the fields of gene experimentation
and therapy and in vitro fertilization, advocates of new biomedical and be-
havioral technologies contend that the long-term societal benefits accruing
from this technology far outweigh their micro, negative side effects.74
70. Id. at 15, 16; see also JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM
IN HEALTH CARE (1982).
71. Walters, supra note 58, at 50; see also Tom L. Beauchamp, The Promise of the Benefi-
cence Model for Medical Ethics, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 145 (1990); Morgan,
supra note 18. See generally EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE
PATIENTS' GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE (1988).
72. Walters, supra note 59, at 50.
73. Leon R. Kass, The New Biology: What Price Relieving Man's Estate?, in CONTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 60, 71 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 1978); see
Michael Kirby, Bioethical Decisions and Opportunity Costs, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 7 (1986).
74. Walters, supra note 59, at 50-51; Scott, supra note 13, at 47.
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C. Justice
Any use of biotechnology brings with it the ever-present problem of how
to distribute its benefits justly and fairly among various social groups. 5
Presently, the vast majority of distributional problems are decided on a local
ad hoc basis. Because demand will normally exceed supply, the threshold
question becomes, for example: Who should receive a kidney transplant, an
artificial heart, or become a candidate for gene therapy? What is the fairest
principle for distribution-first come, first served or medical compatibility?
Should equal access to health care be recognized as an important social goal?
To what extent is there an inequitable distribution of biomedical research
risks to the institutionalized? Finally, is it unjust to distribute health care as
a free market commodity or consider the social utility of persons in distrib-
uting scarce medical services? No definitive answers can be postulated.76
Indeed, as Richard McCormick has cautioned, the operative watchwords
should be: "beware of ethicists bearing solutions!"77 Anyone claiming to
have explicable rules that cut through the philosophical agonies of ambiguity
and uncertainty in our present pluralistic society is guilty of deception.78
"All too often the question of how to distribute justly often is reduced to
who shall decide how to distribute." 79
Although wide social consensus will never be achieved on developing a
framework for resolving difficult medical issues of the New Biology (simply
because the criterion of final selection will vary with the nature of the medi-
cal dilemma or particular biomedical technology used), policies that aid de-
cision making can and must be advanced. Such a set of policies must be
formulated not only to provide protection for the vulnerable, while respect-
ing familial and personal autonomy and privacy, but also to recognize inher-
ent common values and not so much the centrality of technical expertise.
Such values foster humility as well as tolerance and grace.8"
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
The principle of indirect or double effect, one of the basic principles of
Roman Catholic medical ethics,8" and one also intuited by many others not
of the Roman Church, is best understood by an understanding--or often
times by a vague feeling-that the administration of a potentially lethal nar-
75. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
76. Kass, supra note 73, at 65; Walters, supra note 59.
77. RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, THE CRITICAL CALLING 358 (1988).
78. Id.
79. Kass, supra note 73, at 65.
80. Alexander M. Capron, Autonomy and Community, FRONTLINES, Dec. 1988, at 7, 10.
81. ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 39 (1981).
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cotic that would relieve the intractable pain of a cancer patient is in some
way morally different from a knowing act that would murder the same pa-
tient, justifying it on the grounds of acting mercifully.82 Stated otherwise,
[t]he principle is intended to provide a halfway ground between a
straightforward utilitarianism, which would simply consider the
relative weights of the good and bad consequences of an action in
order to make a moral judgment of it, and a variety of sterner
moral positions, which would either deny the moral relevance of
consequences to actions altogether or would judge immoral any
action with bad consequences, no matter what other good conse-
quences it had.",83
The net result of recognizing and applying the Principle of Double Effect
is that certain actions that indirectly produce certain evil consequences are
justified-so long as four conditions are met: the action undertaken, in-
dependent of its effect, must not itself be inherently held to be morally evil;
the evil effect must not be utilized as a means to produce the good effect; the
evil effect is merely tolerated and not sincerely intended; and, finally, regard-
less of its evil consequences, there is a proportionate reason for undertaking
the action.8 4 Utilization of this principle provides the justification, for exam-
ple, of removing a cancerous fetus-bearing uterus and the administration of
pain-relieving narcotics that may produce respiratory depression.85 The
principle's legitimacy has been attacked, alternatively, because it leads to
discriminations that are wrongful by excusing acts (thought to be killings by
some) that should not be excused by and forbidding other acts that should be
allowed.8 6
A principle of such ambivalence is open obviously to these and other logi-
cal deficiencies. However, it has been suggested that validation is recognized
because of its "psychological validity." 7 A use-hypothetical attempts to
bring into focus this point. Faced with a patient's intolerable pain and his or
her pleas for relief that cannot be mitigated by lesser doses of non-lethal
82. Id.
83. Robert M. Martin, Suicide and Self-Sacrifice, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL IS-
SUES 48, 58 (M.Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980).
84. VEATCH, supra note 81, at 39; RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, How BRAVE A NEW
WORLD? app. at 413 (1981); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 80, n. 110 (1983) (accepting that consequences of the
principle of double effect may be justified but not in order to release people from responsibility
for the foreseeable effects of their actions).
85. VEATCH, supra note 81.
86. VEATCH, supra note 81, at 235.
87. David W. Louisell, Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing, 22 CATH. U.
L. REV. 723, 742 (1973).
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drugs, a physician chooses to administer a dose of an analgesic that will
likely cause death. A crucial contrast is then undertaken between the atti-
tude and the manner that the motive for relieving pain engenders compared
with attitudes and manner pursued when a premeditated act to kill is
pursued.88
If the purpose explicitly were to kill, would there not be profound
difference in the very way one would grasp the syringe, the look in
the eye, the words that might be spoken or withheld, those subtle
admixtures of fear and hope that haunt the death-bed scene? And
would not the consequences of the difference be compounded al-
most geometrically at least for the physician as he killed one such
patient after another? And what of the repercussions of the differ-
ence on the nurses and hospital attendants? How long would the
quality and attitude of mercy survive death-intending conduct?
The line between the civilized and savage in men is fine enough
without jeopardizing it by euthanasia. History teaches the line is
maintainable under the principle of double effect; it might well not
be under a regime of direct intentional killing.
8 9
Whether the lessons of history substantiate the alleged "psychological va-
lidity" of the double effect principle and establish that it is efficacious-that
it merits its ready use and retention today seem dubious, at best. Rather
than continue to enshrine an awkward concept, it should be replaced by the
relatively simple and enduring standard of what is, under a given set of facts,
reasonable. Guided by the principle of triage and a consideration of what
actions are in the best interests of the at-risk patient, a cost-benefit analysis
should be undertaken in order to decide whether one modality of treatment
or nontreatment should be pursued. 90 Thus, reasonable, humane, and cost-
effective actions should be both the procedure utilized and the goal sought
here.
The intensive care unit found within the average hospital in the United
States not only seeks to treat and to return patients suffering from serious
injuries or acute diseases to their original working or stabilized environments
but also seeks to serve as a sophisticated, state-of-the-art hospice. 9' Even
when there is no hope of recovery, studies have shown that approximately
nineteen percent of patients in intensive care units are nonetheless admitted
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. George P. Smith, II, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
143 (1985); see also DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL
PROGRESS (1990).
91. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Suicide and The Cancer Patient, 36 CANCER J. CLINI-
CIANS 105, 108 (1986).
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and stay.92 It would seem to be a reasonable and sensible idea for at-risk
patients to forego treatment in an intensive care unit; this choice not neces-
sarily made with the idea of dying sooner, but rather with the view that
access to family and friends will be more easily facilitated and that familial,
social and economic resources will be appropriately conserved. 3
Choices of this nature should not be confused or tied to the principle of
double effect. Rather, when a tragic choice must be made not between dif-
ferent chances of survival with different treatments but only between ex-
tending the process of suffering death or shortening it, the principle has little
pertinence or significance.94 "Patients may very well sensibly decide to
forego treatment or ICU care so that they may in fact finally die and end
their travail. They may directly will their deaths and thus within one strict
interpretation of moral theory, passively commit suicide."
95
Physicians in England are not allowed to initiate any actions that intend,
as their primary purpose, to cause a patient's death.96 Accordingly, under
the Suicide Act of 1961, if a physician were to endeavor to facilitate the
request of a terminally ill patient for assistance in terminating his life, he
would subject himself to criminal prosecution. 97 A physician is also, under
this legislation, not allowed to honor suggestions from the family of a
gravely ill patient to end the life of such a patient.98 On the other hand,
because one of the basic commitments of the medical profession is to ease
pain, if acting to ease suffering, a physician must introduce and follow a
modality of treatment that may in fact hasten death, his or her actions are
ethically and legally permissible so long as the understanding is maintained
that the course of treatment is only for the relief of pain or associated dis-
tress.99 This is a preeminently reasonable modus operandi for dealing with
the double effect construct. In fact, it could be argued that medical actions
of this nature are, in reality, beneficent and thereby advance the very direc-
tion of the principle of beneficience itself.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. CICELY SAUNDERS & MARY BAINES, LIVING WITH DYING: THE MANAGEMENT OF
TERMINAL DISEASE 4 (1983). See generally K.M. Sharma, Euthanasia in Australasia, 2 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 131 (1986).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see 0. RUTH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE (1975); George P. Smith, II, Death Be
Not Proud: Medical Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Resource Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1987).
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V. THE INTERVENTION OF SCIENCE AND ETHICS
Several philosophers have attempted to structure a general system of
bioethics. For Teilhard de Chardin, the "Omega Point," that cultural stage
that will occur in the evolutionary process where "the minds of men have
attained a common language of scientific humanism," 1 ° was a workable
philosophy.101 Darwin constructed a general ethic dependent on a "scien-
tific-philosophic" concept of progress.1 0 2 One contemporary scholar has
stated that Darwin's concept rests on several premises regarding knowledge.
The first assumption is that the limits of knowledge are infinite. Second, no
individual alone can begin to encompass the knowledge that presently exists.
Third, the only effective solution to what may be termed "dangerous knowl-
edge" is more knowledge, which should be disseminated as widely as possi-
ble. Indeed, to Darwin it was wisdom, or the knowledge of how to use
knowledge, that was the most important knowledge of all.10 3
Whether one defines wisdom in Kantian terms, as a policy of action that
espouses "doing or letting be," or as Darwin did, as the knowledge of how to
use knowledge, the principal focus of wisdom is society's competence to
act." Moreover, this problem of how society should use knowledge for the
social good must be considered in terms of the total volume of information
society can manipulate.' 0
5
[M]oral status (our ethical integrity) depends upon two things at
least: first, freedom of choice, and, second, knowledge of the facts
and of the courses between which we may choose. In the absence
of either or both of these things we are, in the forum of conscience,
more like puppets than persons. Lacking freedom and knowledge,
we are not responsible; we are not moral agents or personal be-
ings.... [M]ankind is constantly growing and gaining ground both
in knowledge of life and health and in human control over them.
This is, indeed, the same as saying that the means to heightened
moral stature are available. The appeal of moral idealism is that
we take advantage of every opportunity to grow in wisdom and
stature, that we assume our responsibility; in short, that we not like
human beings."' 0
6
Human beings ideally will act with rational purpose and design in ad-
dressing the ethical problems of biomedical research. Some urge a cessation
100. VAN R. POTTER, BIOETHICS: BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE 34 (1971).
101. Id. at 31.
102. Id. at 45-46.
103. Id. at 49.
104. Id. at 184-186.
105. Id. at 186.
106. JOSEPH FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 35 (1960) (footnote omitted).
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of all research, observing that we lack the necessary knowledge.' °7 Signifi-
cant dangers do exist in undertaking research and in applying the fruits of
that research, '0 8 and man often chooses the path of ignorance to escape the
burden of responsibility that arises from new knowledge. To end research
now, however, will foreclose any opportunity to grow in wisdom and use
that wisdom to act with dignity and responsibility. Because man cannot es-
cape responsibility, we should continue research in the New Biology and
increase the public debate over the social and legal consequences arising
therefrom.' 09
Ethical and scientific factors continuously interact as the scientific process
creates new possibilities that influence ethical judgments."' The set of val-
ues and ordering of commitments to which the scientist ascribes influences
not only the research objectives he or she seeks but also the results he or she
can recognize."' Science is descriptive and attempts to resolve the question:
What is? Ethics is prescriptive and attempts to resolve the question: What
ought to be?" 12 Paradoxically, the law is charged with structuring a stan-
dard for present behavior and simultaneously remains a step behind science
in a reactive capacity." 3 Exclusive reliance should not be placed on legal
remedies, however, to resolve the complex ethical problems that biomedical
research presents.'" 4 Indeed, the law should probably not support any one
particular scientific ethic, however styled." 5
Much of the ethical theory surrounding biomedicine attempts to harmo-
nize individual desires with the greater social welfare." 6 Moral dilemmas in
biomedicine may be thought of as arising from real or apparent conflicts
between perceived obligations to distant generations and to the present gen-
eration.'1 7 In determining whether continued investigations into genetic en-
gineering will jeopardize future life, one should inquire whether an act with
107. See Harold P. Green, Genetic Technology: Law and Policy for the Brave New World,
48 IND. L.J. 559, 576-80 (1973).
108. See Wolfgang Friedmann, Interference with Human Life. Some Jurisprudential Re-
flections, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1058, 1076 (1970).
109. Id. at 1077.
110. See generally PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CON-
TROL 19-22 (1970).
111. Friedmann, supra note 108.
112. Fletcher, supra note 39, at 776.
113. Burger, supra note 28, at 213.
114. Frank P. Grad, New Beginnings in Life: A Lawyer's Response, in THE NEW GENET-
ICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 64, 77 (Michael Hamilton ed., 1972).
115. Id.
116. See generally ALASTAIR V. CAMPBELL, MORAL DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE 1, 13
(1972).
117. Daniel Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations?, 164 AM. EC-
CLESIASTICAL REV. 265, 275 (1971).
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uncertain consequences would be harmful to one's own children.' 18 Hu-
mankind should not inflict on future generations that which can be disas-
trous to a present generation. 1 9
One scholar has suggested a bioethical creed for individuals. The creed
states that "the future survival and development of mankind, both culturally
and biologically, is strongly conditioned by man's present activities and
plans."' 12 The creed encompasses a corresponding commitment to live life
and to influence the lives of others to promote the evolution of a better world
for future generations by avoiding actions that would detrimentally impact
the future. 121
VI. BIOETHICS: THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE
Bioethics can be seen as having no defined essence that sets it apart as a
distinct study or discipline. Rather, its individuation derives from a defacto
set of issues interrelated by what might be termed "family resemblances."
While a common thread joining all of the issues is exceedingly difficult to
find, the central core comprising the list of these issues is, without question,
a concern over the technology of control of man's or woman's body, his or
her mind and the quality of his or her life.' 2 2 Many of the concerns of
bioethics focus on the legislation, policies, and guidelines that need to be
enacted and enforced at the state, local, and federal levels with respect to all
of the issues comprising the de facto set. 123 It has been suggested that
bioethical concerns are no more than those prohibitions that all rational peo-
ple urge everyone to follow in an effort to avoid evils on which common
agreement exists. 124
Outside the individual context of determining how one treats another and
at the broader societal level, in order for moral acceptability to be given, a
democratic consensus must be reached acknowledging that a certain good
must be promoted though its promotion causes some degree of harm. It is
within this setting that much of what is recognized as "bioethics" is focused.
118. Id. at 279.
119. Id. at 279-80.
120. POTrER, supra note 100, at 196.
121. Id.
122. K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 62-64 (Tom
L. Beauchamp & Leroy Walters eds., 3d ed. 1989). See M. CHARLESWORTH, LIFE, DEATH,
GENES AND ETHICS 13-34 (1989).
123. Clouser, supra note 122, at 63. See generally Symposuim: Ethics, Bioethics and Fam-
ily Law, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 735.
124. Id. See generally 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 115-127 (Warren T. Reich ed.,
1978); see also Sidney A. Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 (1990).
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Although individual morality operates primarily within a system of re-
straints, policies affecting society as a whole operate on a level where promo-
tion of goods is a moral option. The pivotal question thus becomes, "What
goods ought to be restrained (e.g., scientific research)?" Of necessity, priori-
ties, values, and goods must all be weighed, balanced, and compared. 125
Whenever the benefits and the risks of a particular course of action are
weighed, it is important to remember that those very elements in the balanc-
ing test are based upon value judgments. 126
It is suggested that bioethics should be viewed as but a natural response
not only to socio-politico-religious-medical dilemmas, but also to increased
knowledge and threatened rights and not as a new discovery of basic princi-
ples. '27 As such, bioethics does not require application of a new morality.128
Morality is neither investigated nor legislated. Rather, it is "discovered" by
an unpacking, explication, and articulation of individual intuitions about
what ought be undertaken and what ought not be done. When new lines of
action are discovered, derived rules emerge that in turn lead to defined re-
sults presenting new conflicts with basic ethical and moral norms. 129
VII. LAW REFORM IN AMERICA
A. The National Conference of State Laws
In 1891, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws (the "Conference") was conceived as an undertaking that would unify
the legal systems of the fifty states, and complement the national incentive
toward unity.130 The Conference structured itself accordingly as an organi-
zation that would deal with the business of promoting a national uniformity
of laws without displacing the state courts. 131
Although the drafting of uniform laws is central to any real effort to build
and maintain uniformity, such efforts are only partially effective unless they
are translated into law. Regrettably, many state legislators are either still
125. Clouser, supra note 122, at 63. See generally Samuel Gorovitz, Bioethics and Social
Responsibility, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 52, 52-60 (Tom L. Beauchamp &
Leroy Walters eds., 1978).
126. Kirby, supra note 73.
127. Clouser, supra note 122, at 54.
128. Id. at 62.
129. Id.; see Michael Kirby, Bioethics '89: Can Democracy Cope?, 18 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 5 (1990).
130. WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 3, 15
(1991).
13 1. Id. at 1, 11.
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insufficiently aware of the activities of the Conference l1 2 or perhaps unwill-
ing to share their legislative prerogatives with the Conference and its com-
missioners. Still, the primary purpose of uniform laws-namely, the
elimination of uncertaintya33-is advanced by the work of the Conference;
and better legislation is enacted as a direct consequence of its work.134 Cur-
rently, the Conference achievement list includes ninety-nine uniform acts
and twenty-four model acts as well as twelve other recommended acts-with
one hundred and forty-one other works having been withdrawn as obsolete
or superseded.
135
B. The American Law Institute
The American Bar Association founded the American Law Institute (the
"Institute") in 1923 in response to a developing attitude among lawyers that
they have a unique public function to perform in improving law and its ad-
ministration.'3 6 The Institute presents restatements of the law that explain
undergirding principles used in formulating various laws, analyzes the ex-
isting conditions of those laws, and sets forth the legal problems involved in
implementing them.137
The object of each Restatement of the Law by the Institute is simple and
direct: namely "to improve the law, not merely by clarifying and simplifying
it, but also by better adapting it to existing needs."' 138 In meeting this object,
the Institute, "not only ascertains what the law is but what it ought to be,
bearing in mind that the changes advocated should be confined to those
designed to carry out the policies which are generally admitted to be desira-
ble and which do not touch subjects of general public controversy." 139
As a point of historical comparison, in England at the end of the sixteenth
century, Sir Francis Bacon suggested that a commission be organized to con-
duct on-going studies to investigate obsolete and contradictory laws and that
132. Id. at 129.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at 131.
135. Id. at 130. Perhaps the three most significant and enduring Conference enactments are
the Uniform Partnership Act, over seventy-seven years old, the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, over forty years old, and the Uniform Commercial Code, over thirty-three years
old. Id. at 4. But see James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2132-33
(1991) (arguing that the growing power of the Federal Government in the legislative process
poses a real threat to the Commission's effectiveness in legislative drafting).
136. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 50TH ANNIVER-
SARY 13-14 (2d ed. 1973).
137. Id. at 50.
138. Id. at 132.
139. Id. at 56. See generally HERBERT F. GOODRICH, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE 1923-1961 (1961).
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these reports be submitted to Parliament."4 This practice continues today
formally through the institution of Law Reform Commission in the United
Kingdom. 141
VIII. THE NEW BIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES
Recognizing the growing complexity and interrelatedness of law, science,
and medicine, on November 9, 1978, the Congress of the United States au-
thorized creation of a presidential commission-styled subsequently as the
President's Commission for The Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the "President's Commission").142
Although intended to have four years to complete its work,143 delays in
funding the President's Commission and making appointments to it, meant
it had little more than three years to complete its studies into not only ethi-
cal issues in research with human beings, fetal research, and psychosurgery,
but also the grounds to forego life-sustaining treatment and others. 144
From 1975 to 1978, the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the "National
Commission"), whose membership was appointed by the Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, had sought to study basic
legal-ethical issues involved with undertakings in human research.14 The
National Commission's limited agenda was expanded and diversified by the
establishment of the President's Commission (created to tackle, and thereby
chart, the social, legal, ethical, medical, and scientific frontiers of The New
Biology).146 Both this National Commission and the President's Commis-
sion provided a solid foundation upon which necessary work in law, science,
and medicine could be conducted. And, in 1983, such a need was ad-
140. Michael Kirby, Law Reform As 'Ministering to Justice,' in LEGAL CHANGE: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF JULIUS STONE 201, 202, n.13 (A.R. Blackshield ed., 1983).
141. WILLIAM H. HURLBURT, LAW REFORM COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 3 (1986); see also THE LAW COMMISSION AND LAW REFORM
(Graham Zellick ed., 1988).
142. 42 U.S.C. s 300v (1988).
143. See Act of Dec. 20, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 1830
(allowing the Commission to extend its life from December 31, 1982, until March 31, 1983).
144. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SUMMING UP: FINAL REPORT
ON STUDIES OF THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1983).
145. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342.
146. See Alexander M. Capron, Looking Back at the President's Commission, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 7.
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dressed-but not resolved. 147
IX. THE POLITICS OF ABORTION: A ROADBLOCK TO BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS RESEARCH
By the 1985 enactment of Public Law 99-158, Congress created a Bi-
omedical Ethics Advisory Committee (the "Advisory Committee") that was
to have been governed by a bipartisan Biomedical Ethics Board (the "Con-
gressional Board") whose membership was in turn comprised of three
Republicans and three Democrats each from both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.14 The Board appointed the fourteen members of the
Committee and was charged with overseeing their activities.149 Almost a
year elapsed before the twelve members of the Congressional Board were
appointed and yet another year and a half passed before the Board appointed
members of the Advisory Committee.15°
When on March 8, 1990, the Senate members of the Congressional Board
met to elect a chairman, a rancorous debate erupted among various "pro-
choice" and "pro-life" senators with the "pro-life" faction expressing their
concern that, "they needed at least equal representation on the Committee,
while pro-choice senators felt they had ceded representation far in excess of
the pro-life segment of the general population. Neither side trusted that the
committee would carry out its work in a way that would be both fair and
useful.""'' Subsequent maneuvering forced an amendment to a pending ap-
propriations bill that precluded funding the Committee's budget until the
Board elected a Chairman, and a Vice Chairman and filled a vacancy on the
Committee itself.152 This action effectivly killed the Congressional Biomedi-
cal Ethics Advisory Committee on September 30, 1990.1-3
When discussion occurs from time to time about renewing efforts to estab-
lish a federal bioethics commission, it always acknowledges that the first-
order issues of the commencement and conclusion of life and the abortion
issue are simply too political for congressional study. Thus, any future
bioethics commission would be mandated, instead, to study issues related to
health care financing, genetics, and/or standards of conduct for undertaking
147. See John P. Bunker & Jinnet Fowles, The President's Commission: Do We Need a
Sequel?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 10.
148. Robert M. Cook-Degan, Abortion Politics Deals Death Blow to Bioethics Body Set Up
By Congress, KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS NEWSLETTER July, 1990, at 3.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 5.
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biomedical research. 154
X. THE AUSTRALIAN INITIATIVES
Through a National Australian Law Reform Commission-and various
complimentary commissions in its six states-together with, notably, a Na-
tional Health and Medical Research Council, the Australian government has
charted an enviable reputation as the leader in the law reform movement and
is thus anticipating, and thereby legislating and regulating, an agenda for
dealing with the advances in biotechnology. I55 Early and on-going studies
and proposals on artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryonic re-
search, tissue transplantation, and surrogation-to name but a few-have
prdduced significant reports that have given rise not only to the development
of general guidelines but comprehensive procedures concerning the new
medical and scientific procedures in the field of biotechnology.' 56 To its
credit, the National Health and Medical Research Council has also struc-
tured professional guidelines-acting as such in their promulgation after the
pertinent legal issues have first been explored and charted by the various
state law reform bodies.' 57
The Kirby Imperative
Before assuming the Presidency of The Court of Appeal of the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, Michael D. Kirby served with national and in-
ternational distinction as Chairman of the Law Reform Commission of Aus-
tralia and as a Deputy President of the Australian Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission. It was in his capacity as Chairman of the Law
Reform Commission that he began to address the problems of law in action
and its need to serve the ends of justice - especially in developing a frame-
work for principled decisionmaking for advances with the New Biology.' 58
Now, as a wise, distinguished, and courageous jurist, Justice Kirby contin-
ues to be an eloquent voice, educating from both on and off the bench, 59 as
154. Id. at 2.
155. Loane Skene, Moral and Legal Issues in the New Biotechnology, 59 AUSTRL. L.J. 379
(1985); see Ron Johnston, Social Responsibility of Science: The Social Mirror of Science, in THE
COMMONWEALTH OF SCIENCE: ANZAAS AND THE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE IN AUSTRALA-
SIA 1888-1988 308 (Roy MacLeod ed., 1988). See generally AUSTRALASIAN LAW REFORM
AGENCIES CONFERENCE (Sept. 1987).
156. Skene, supra note 155, at 389.
157. Id.
158. See MICHAEL D. KIRBY, REFORM THE LAW: ESSAYS ON THE RENEWAL OF THE
AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1983). See generally O.R. MCGREGOR, SOCIAL HISTORY AND
LAW REFORM (1981).
159. See generally A.J. Rodgers, Judges in Search of Justice, 10 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 93
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an internationally regarded commentator and teacher -- educating, as to
both the perils and the opportunities of the new and daunting biotechnology
and the compelling need to recognize humaneness as an indispensable com-
ponent of enlightened action. 6 ' His unflagging commitment to education
through full public discourse and his indefatigable pursuit of truth-without
polemicizing it-was acknowledged recently by his recognition as one of the
thirteen men and women of the Australian Continent (of seventeen million
people) who has made a significant and enduring contribution to the growth
of Australia as a Nation.' 6 2 Truly, in Justice Kirby one sees the quintessen-
tial judicial role model who follows the admonition of Socrates to hear cour-
teously, answer wisely, consider soberly, and decide impartially.' 6 3
With Justice Kirby maintaining visible strength and, indeed, viligance in
the vanguard of the New Biology, the pathway for resolving the myriad and
complex bioethical conundrums is a pathway that has been cleared and is
being expanded-as it is marked-with illuminating guideposts. It remains
for those traveling the pathway to but read, understand, and react in a posi-
tive and humane way to road signs that he has designed.
XI. CONCLUSION
It is seen that bioethics raises the central question of how to live, adjust,
and relate to the new, and sometimes startling, reproductive technologies; 1
or, as the late Professor Nancy Rhoden questioned, can the contemporary
inquiry of bioethics be tempered through the assertion of humane values or
must everything, including our very dignity and automony, be sacrificed up
to it?' 6
5
As the "chariot of science" drives forward with dazzling speed, the "time
cushion" within which legislation can be enacted to thereby codify societal
standards or preferential orderings has evaporated.166 This is especially evi-
(1987). But see, Alan A. Stone, Judges as Medical Decision Makers, 12 HUM. LIFE REV. 84
(1986) (arguing that it is not uncommon for judges to make misleading, costly statements
about medical realities, thereby undermining the credibility of the courts in the eyes of the
medical profession, and that of the medical profession in the eyes of the public).
160. See Barry Jones, The Dim Nation, BULLETIN, Oct. 2, 1990, at 34.
161. Kirby, supra note 27.
162. See Jones, supra note 160.
163. Leon R. Yankwich, The Art of Being a Judge, in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 12 (Glenn
R. Winters ed., 1975).
164. Stated otherwise, "Bioethics attempts to develop a philosophy regarding the applica-
tion of man's biological knowledge in furtherance of the social good." POTTER, supra note
100, at 26.
165. John D. Arras, Nancy Rhoden: Exploring The Dark Side of Medical Technology, 68
N.C. L. REV. 835, 835-36 (1990); see Smith, supra note 27.
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dent considering that although a scientific discovery may often occur within
an instance of time, working through the legal and social consequences of
these discoveries tends to absorb an inordinate amount of energy. 167
Although in the past the problems of biomedical ethics have been viewed
with diffidence and uncertainty and regarded as intractable,16 a new, edu-
cated, and institutional response is demanded "if democracy is to be more
than a myth and a shibboleth in the age of mature science and technology
....169 If this response is not forthcoming, we "resign ourselves to being
taken where the scientists' and technologists' imagination leads." 17 And,
sadly,
that path may involve nothing less than the demise of the Rule of
Law as we know it. It is for our society to decide whether there is
an alternative or whether the dilemmas posed by modem science
and technology, particularly in the field of bioethics, are just too
painful, technical, complicated, sensitive and controversial for our
institutions of government."171
TIME is of the essence!
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